This paper analyzes the theoretical finance-growth nexus in the case of developing countries. Using the Neoclassical growth framework, we raise a new issue where the finance-growth nexus has multiple stationary states with threshold effect. Threshold effect prevents the economy to reach long-run steady state equilibrium of capital stock. We show that financial intermediary is better than financial market in order to reduce threshold effect, and to ensure the existence and uniqueness of a higher long-run steady state equilibrium of capital stock by promoting long-term investment.
Introduction
During the last two decades, the literatures on the nexus between financial development and economic growth emerge, but the findings are still subject to relevant debate until nowadays 2 . In developing countries, particularly, financial development is associated with banking sector development, since financial market is underdeveloped.
However, the more recent literature suggests that financial market should be also taken into account to spur economic growth, even in developing countries. Using a very large cross-country sample incorporating both developed and developing countries, Levine and Servos (1998) show that stock market liquidity leads to faster rate of growth, productivity improvement, and capital accumulation 3 . Their paper supports Levine (1991) and Bencivenga et al (1995) , where stock market liquidity facilitates long-term investment, since investors can easily sell their stake in the project if they need liquidity before their project matures. Enhanced liquidity and long-term investment, therefore, increase higherreturn projects that boost productivity growth.
Meanwhile, it is also well accepted that financial market tends to be more prone to asymmetric information problems and thus, financial liberalization fostering stock market liquidity is often blamed for macroeconomic downturn, as well as banking vulnerability and crisis (Bihde, 1993; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detagriache, 1999) . Thus, the adverse effect of financial market occurs. This is why according to Diamond (1984) the presence of bank as financial intermediation is necessary, since banks have technology to gain information from investors which enhance investor's rational decision based on their consumption profile.
Building on the previous literatures on the importance of financial intermediation on economic growth, Bencivenga and Smith (1991) show that financial intermediation is better than financial autarky (financial market) in order to spur economic growth. In their contribution, there are basic lists of bank activities such as loans funded deposits, holding liquid reserves against predictable withdrawal demands, issuing liabilities that are more liquid than their primary asset, and reducing the need of self-investment. The main result of their model is that financial intermediation promotes the productive long-term (illiquid) investment rather than short-term (liquid) ventures.
However, the optimal proportion of long-term investment is decreasing in the income of long-term investment itself, although it is increasing in the fraction of entrepreneurs. It is also surprising that the optimal proportion of long-term investment is increasing in the income of short-term ventures and the fraction of non-entrepreneurs.
Hence, although the income of long-term investment is higher than the income of shortterm ventures, it does not always incitate agents to be entrepreneur. This implies that entrepreneurship is not always a growth-enhancing factor.
3 Stock market liquidity refers to the less expensive cost of equities trading.
Recently, both theoretical and empirical studies have questioned the positive link between financial intermediation and economic growth. Deidda and Fattouh (2002) theoretically show a non-linear relationship between financial intermediation and endogenous growth. The effect of financial intermediation on economic growth remains ambiguous at low initial levels of banking sector development and the existence of riskaverse agents. This is because risk-averse agents always prefer to incur financial transaction costs even though the expected return on their savings is lower than under financial autarky. Such a situation occurs because financial intermediation can fully perform in risk diversification process. As a result, economic growth rate under banking sector is lower than under financial autarky. At high levels of the banking sector development, the relationship between banking sector development and economic growth is always positive, where the level of banking sector development depends on the initial level of real per capita income.
In the empirical examination, Deidda and Fattouh (2002) also find that there is no significant effect of financial development on economic growth in low-income countries, whereas in high-income countries, there is a positive link between financial development and economic growth. Mihci (2006) highlights that the relationship between finance and growth does not necessarily positive when substantial variations across different periods and country groups are taken into account. Meanwhile, Crouzille et al (2007) indicate the presence of threshold effect on the link between rural bank development and regional growth in the Philippines.
The aim of this paper is therefore to reevaluate a theoretical finance-growth nexus. We modify several hypothesis used by Bencivenga and Smith (1991) . First, since our motivation is to model the most suitable condition for developing countries, we consider that externalities changes due to technological innovation may be less important, so that they may not much play a pivotal role in boosting economic growth. Hence, we use the Neo-classical growth hypothesis without externalities in an overlapping generation (OLG) model with three periods instead of drawing endogenous growth model as developed by Bencivenga and Smith (1991) , or Deidda and Fattouh (2002 Our results differ from that of Deidda and Fattouh (2002) for several reasons.
First, we use the Neoclassical growth framework, while they use endogenous growth.
Second, we emphasize that banking sector develooment is always better than financial autarky to decrease threshold level and increase long-run capital stock, while in Deidda and Fattouh (2002) the opposite is true at low levels of the financial development. Third, our threshold effect is due to the initial level of capital stock, while in their model, threshold effect is due to the initial level of real per capita income. Since the real per capita income depends on the initial level of capital stock for production, their model may suffer from major reverse causality problems on the finance-growth nexus.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model setup. Section 3 lays out the financial market model. Section 4 shows the financial intermediary equilibrium. Section 5 examines the study of capital stock dynamic and threshold effect. Section 6 concludes.
The Set-Up
The framework we use is one of overlapping generations (OLG) model with three periods and a unique good. We draw the set-up of Bencivenga and Smith (1991) which is originated from Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , where all agents need liquidity and banks play a role to provide liquidity for them. We assume that there is no population growth in the economy and each generation consists of a continuum of agents with size 1
Each agent may live for two or three periods. Let t be the time index, where the young and middle-age generations are endowed with an initial per firm capital stock of 0 k units at t = 0 and 1 k units at t = 1, respectively. Moreover, each young agent supplies inelastically one unit of labour in the first period.
At the first period, all agents of a generation are identical. At the beginning of the second period, the agents learn whether they will be either non-entrepreneurs (twoperiod-lived agents) or entrepreneurs (three-period-lived agents) with probability ) 1 (   and  , respectively. Thus, there are N ) 1 (   agents who will be non-entrepreneur at the second period and N  agents who will be entrepreneur at the third period. All young agents save entirely their labour income in the first period.
If agents are non-entrepreneur, they consume their second period incomes, t c 1 . If the agent is entrepreneur, he consumes the profit of production in the third period, t c 2 .
Thus, agents have different liquidity needs and the non-entrepreneurs have higher liquidity need than entrepreneurs, since non-entrepreneurs only live for two periods.
Meanwhile, the young agents have incentive to be entrepreneur because the profit of long-term investment is relatively higher than the return of non-entrepreneur's saving.
We also assume that entrepreneurs are risk-neutral following Azariadis and Smith (1998) .
Finally, whatever the type of agents, we can define the agent's preferences by the following expected utility function.
We define it c as the period i consumption of an agent who is born at t. The constant relative risk aversion is denoted by 1    . The variable  stands for the individual specific random variable realized at the beginning of period 2. Thus, the value of  is equal to 0 with probability   1 , or 1 with probability .
In order to complete this model, we characterize the production function and the entrepreneur's behaviour. The entrepreneur's production t y is realized by physical capital t k and units of labour t L . We follow the Cobb-Douglas production function as follows
is the part of production that uses t k and A is an arbitrary coefficient. For simplification, we assume that capital depreciates completely at the end of period.
Furthermore, there is no endowment of capital at period 0  t except for the initial old generation and middle-age generation. In order to complete the entrepreneur program, the profit function must be established. The entrepreneur's profit t  is the difference between the production and the cost of quantity units of labour defined
. At the equilibrium of labour market, labour demand t L is equal to labour supply, N N t  , which is obtained by maximizing the entrepreneur's profit subject to t L . Thus, we have
and the maximized profit function at each period t as much as
The Financial Market Equilibrium
This system refers to an economy without the presence of bank as financial intermediary. In the first period, the agents divide their savings t s between liquid and illiquid assets. Liquid assets are considered as inventory of consumption goods. One unit invested in liquid asset at t directly yields 0  n units of consumption goods at both 1  t and 2  t . On the other hand, one unit invested in the illiquid asset yields R units of capital goods at t+2. If illiquid asset is liquidated at t+1, then the agents receive the "scrap value" of x units of consumption goods, where n x   0 .
In order to establish the agents' budget constraint, we define 
At the first period, the agents' saving is equal to labour income, 
be the interest rate of the liquid asset, illiquid asset, and "scrap" value, respectively. At the second period, let t 1  be the income of non-entrepreneur after one period, then
, where
By the hypothesis, if the agents are entrepreneur, then their consumption at the second period is equal to zero. At the beginning of the third period, the entrepreneur sells his illiquid assets and reinvests them in the physical capital, so that
. This situation corresponds to the financial autarky case. At the third period, let t 2  be the income received by entrepreneur before the production, then , where
We use (6.a) to construct the dynamics of capital stock as follows
Using the profit function (3) and the budget constraints in the equation (4), (5) 
Meanwhile, the agents' optimization program is defined as 
where
The optimal proportion of illiquid investment 
The Financial Intermediary Equilibrium
We assume that agent's financial decisions are intermediated through the banking system. Therefore, we can directly define the program of financial intermediaries realized by an institution called as "bank". We assume that bank is a coalition of young agents who can be either non-entrepreneur or entrepreneur. . Thus, banks must provide consumption goods for entrepreneurs as much as
In the next step, we define the program of financial intermediation for two types of agent.
Firstly, there are ) 1 (   non-entrepreneurs who will liquidate their investment at t+1.
Thus, the bank must ensure the non-entrepreneur by holding 
Note that in the third period (t+2), entrepreneurs will use their income of investment to finance physical capital and use it in the production. Hence, we have
(11), we have the relationship between the current and the future capital stock as follows
In order to simplify condition in the equation (13), we assume that the bank should provide the liquidity at t+1, since none of the capital assets is liquidated "prematurely".
Thus, the bank should fulfil the following liquidity constraint
By this assumption, we can reduce some variables as follows. In the third period (t+2), the bank will only consider the existence of  entrepreneur.
Since the entrepreneur runs the production to get the profit, then their profit should be superior to all income of liquid investment. Such condition provides incentive for agents to become entrepreneur. In other words, n R A   , and Meanwhile, the bank also maximizes the expected utility of non-entrepreneur. It means that the bank will reallocate the non-entrepreneur's illiquid assets into liquid assets at the beginning of t+1. For realizing this strategy, the bank will therefore set
Using (15.c) and (15.d), we simplify (10), (11) and (12) respectively become
Using (16), (17), and (18), and the budget constraint (9) we establish the program of financial intermediaries as follows
Hence, banks will choose
. From the first-order condition, we obtain the optimal proportion of illiquid asset ( 
Capital Stock Accumulation and Threshold Effect
In comparing the level of steady state equilibrium of capital stock under the financial market and financial intermediary model, we establish Proposition 1 and 2 as follows. 
Proposition 1

Proof:
From (8) and (20) , we verify that
As discussed above, Proposition 1 is laid down for 0  x . This condition can be interpreted as the best case in which financial market is efficient, since there is no premature liquidation to fulfill the liquidity of two-period-lived agents. Proposition 1 explicitly shows that although the financial market is at the best condition, the illiquid investment of the financial market equilibrium is always lower than that of the financial intermediary equilibrium. From Proposition 1, we lay out Proposition 2 as a consequence of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2
The existence of banks in an economy enhances economic growth more significantly than the absence of banks.
Proof:
In the financial intermediary equilibrium, economic growth is determined by the value of
Meanwhile, in the financial market equilibrium, economic growth is determined by the value of of ) (
are the change of capital stock in the financial intermediary and financial market equilibrium, respectively. Proposition 2 is thus proved.
From (6.b) and (14), weI illustrate the dynamics of capital accumulation in each case as follows 8 .
Figure 1. The Dynamics of Capital Stock
In Figure 1 , we observe the existence of threshold effects at the stationary states Moreover, we observe that the financial intermediary model is more accurate than the financial market model to reduce the threshold effect. We verify this property in Proposition 3.
8 Numerical examples are available on request. 
Proof:
To prove Proposition 3, we verify the existence of threshold effect in both the financial intermediary and financial market equilibriums. Then, we compare both of them.
(i) The financial intermediary equilibrium
At the stationary states, we have )
. Unfortunately it is difficult to solve the stationary capital stocks ( k ) algebraically. From Figure (1 Under this condition, we simply obtain
Despite assuming that 1   , we do not change the properties of the financial intermediary model. Since our purpose is to formalize the role of financial intermediation in enhancing entrepreneurship through long-term investment, the absence of nonentrepreneurs does not affect the change of capital stock. This is because economic growth should not be relied on non-entrepreneurs but entrepreneurs. From (22.b), we examine if there is t k in which the right hand side becomes positive. In other words,
and we obtain
Equation (24) is simply defined as the threshold level of the financial intermediary equilibrium, since for each 0 k where
The existence of threshold effect in the financial intermediary equilibrium is therefore confirmed.
(ii) The financial market equilibrium
To prove the existence of threshold effect under the financial market equilibrium, we use the same characterization of the bank-based economy. Assume that 1   and 1   . This means that financial market only exists for responding the entrepreneur's needs. By solving the first-order condition for ) ( t m k  and its limit for 1  
, we obtain
The threshold effect . Hence, the existence of threshold effect in the financial market equilibrium is confirmed.
(iii). Financial intermediary vs. financial market
From (24) and (26), we verify that the threshold level of the financial intermediary equilibrium is lower than that of the financial market equilibrium by proving that
For 1   , we have that the left hand side tends to 0, but the right hand side tends to infinity. Instead, for 0   , we denote the left hand side tends to 0, and the right hand side tends to 1. By these results, Proposition 3 is proved.
Threshold effects in the finance-growth nexus is one of main features of our model. This finding is particularly important in developing countries, where banking sector development should be taken into very close consideration rather than financial market development. curve, the economy may disappear because the steady state equilibrium of capital stock tends to zero. In this case, we denote that the financial intermediary equilibrium is better than the financial market equilibrium in order to ensure the existence and uniqueness of long-run steady state capital stock, and to reduce the threshold level. In turn, a long-term economic growth can be realized due to an increase in long-term productive investments and a decline in short-term ventures. By extension, the potential source of speculations from short-term ventures can be therefore reduced.
Nevertheless, if the initial capital stock lies below the threshold level of the financial intermediary equilibrium ( * 0 b k k  ) as shown in Figure 1 , the steady state equilibrium of capital stock can approach to zero, even if there is a financial intermediary in the economy. In such a case, we observe that there is no positive link between financial development and economic growth in developing country, when the initial capital stock is very low. On the other hand, if developing country has sufficiently a high capital stock, then the introduction of banking system ensures the economy to converge to the higher long-run steady state equilibrium.
Conclusion
In providing further issue on the finance-growth nexus, we have reevaluated the model of financial intermediation à la Bencivenga and Smith (1991) . Our originality is twofold. First, in modelling the finance-growth nexus, we use the Neo-classical growth framework instead of drawing endogenous growth as developed by Bencivenga and Smith (1991) . Second, we distinguish the behaviour vis-à-vis of risk between nonentrepreneur and entrepreneur.
Using these features, we find that the financial intermediary equilibrium is better than the financial market equilibrium in order to ensure the existence and uniqueness of long-run steady state equilibrium of capital accumulation, as a necessary condition to achieve long-run economic growth. Moreover, we found that any type of financial development (either through financial intermediary or financial market) has a threshold effect. But the presence of banks as financial intermediaries clearly reduces the threshold level of the financial market equilibrium. Threshold effect is a new finding in the financegrowth nexus, since it captures the difficulty of raising initial capital stocks and reaching long-run economic growth. Thus, threshold effect should be acknowledged in the next empirical research on the finance-growth nexus, notably in developing countries, where externalities due to human capital and technological innovations are not yet welldeveloped.
